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Latin America could be potential place of a new terrorist attack. Argentina s economy is
vulnerable in world process of globalising. The high rate of unemployment has caused a
level of social unrest in Argentina. The major political challenge is to improve the employ-
ment situation. Official policy is encouraging insiders and outsiders to bring investments
into the country. One-third of all foreign investment - especially in privatised state indus-
tries has come from debt-equity conversions. Argentina sforeign debt of 132 USD billion
represents about one of seventh of all developing countries debt. Economy crisis in Argen-
tina, situation in Brazil, Uruguay and other Latin American countries could lead to the
terrorism similar to the one that is coming from Islamic East.
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1. Introduction
In this era of the world terrorism, the impor-
tant question, in order to prevent it, is where and
why the terrorist could strike again. My thesis is that
Latin America could be potential place of a new ter-
rorist attack. The reason for this is the big economic
crisis that struck the states of Latin America, par-
ticularly Argentina. However, there is a theoretical
possibility that the USA could be attacked again, but
this time not by Al-Qaeda or some other terrorist
organisation, but by its own citizens; Latin Ameri-
cans living in the USA because of American eco-
nomic prosperity. Because of the bankruptcy and
probably the hardest crisis any Latin American state
has ever been through, in this article I am going to
explain the main characteristics of the Argentinean
economy along with the recent events such as bank-
ruptcy.
. Journalist
2. History of the
Argentinean Economy
The Early Period Most pre-Hispanic settling
in the country later to be called Argentina was by
groups engaged in agriculture or following nomadic
lifestyles. The main reason for relatively slow de-
velopment of Argentina as a colony was lack of pre-
cious metals sought by the Spanish, including silver
(Jat. argentum) the country was named for. Although
the Rio de la Plata (or the River Plate) was discov-
ered in 1516, hostile Indian activity kept Europeans
out of Argentina until the final establishment of Bue-
nos Aires in 1580. Although Buenos Aires rebelled
against Spain in 1810, the "estancieros" (landed gen-
try) and merchants who held official trading licenses
largely opposed it.
Institutional Organisation and Growth Af-
ter decades of the civil war, around 1860, the nation
began to reach its modern extent. Basic institutions
and infrastructure were established. In 1880 the dec-
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laration of Buenos Aires as a federal district stopped
the traditional rivalry between that city and the rest
of the country. Massive European immigration mixed
the population, foreign investment brought new tech-
nologies and helped develop the infrastructure, com-
mercial activity expanded, and Argentina entered a
period of great prosperity and progress.
In the early 1900s Argentina continued to grow
and generally prosper. Encouraged by legal reforms,
in 1916, the traditional, more conservative leadership
was replaced by a Radical Civil Union reformist presi-
dent. The Radicals held the presidency until 1930,
when President Yrigoyen was ousted by a military
coup, inaugurating an era of military intervention.
Peron and the Era of Nationalism In 1946,
15 years of military influence or direct military gov-
ernment, resulted in the election of Juan Domingo
Peron as president.
Under Peron, labour took on a significant role
in society. Many industries were nationalised, and
foreign investment and participation in the economy
was restricted in an effort to allow Argentina to de-
velop as a self-sufficient entity. However, develop-
ment was inefficient and incomplete, and the coun-
try incurred massive debts to support its various
projects.
By 1955 economic conditions led to a back-
lash among the middle class, students, and elements
of the clergy, business, and military. Peron fled the
country following a military coup. If Peron had erred
by meeting too much the demands of labour, the
military pushed the pendulum too far in the opposite
direction, offending not only leftists but also students,
business interests, and Argentina's large middle class.
More intensified public discontent gave rise to armed
guerrilla opposition movements during the late
1960s.
Peron returned from exile in the midst of grow-
ing anarchy, assumed the presidency in 1973, but
died suddenly in 1974. The military took over again
in 1976 by worsening economic and social condi-
tions. In contrast with most previous military inter-
ventions, the 1976 coup was designed to allow con-
sultation and power sharing among all service
branches. The "junta" ruled from 1976 to 1983 dur-
ing a period known as the "Proceso." Rightist offi-
cial and unofficial organisations sought to wipe out
the existing and potential subversive opposition, the
definition of which was extremely broad. This re-
sulted in the death or disappearance of thousands of
Argentineans (the "desaparecidos" in Spanish). This
domestic trauma was compounded by a worsening
economy. Production foundered and the country
racked up foreign debts ofUSD 36 billion at the end
of 1981 as inflation soared.
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In 1982 the "junta" occupied The Falkland
Islands (Argentinean name: Las Islas Malvinas) -
which were taken over by Britain in 1833. This sov-
ereignty issue was popular at home, but the "junta"
badly miscalculated international response, particu-
larly from Britain, which sent elite troops to retake
the islands. After a short, sharp conflict, known as
the South Atlantic War, the British ejected
Argentinean forces.
Return to Civilian Rule Despite the general
expectation that the Peronists would take power; the
more moderate Radicals won both the presidency and
the majority in the legislature in the 1983 general
elections. President Raul Alfonsin put former "junta"
members on trial, and several high-ranking officials
were convicted and jailed. Military protests occurred
when individuals were charged; the government
backed down and peace was restored. Meanwhile,
the Argentinean society reopened, but the hard eco-
nomic issues remained. The Alfonsin administration
began the reconstruction of Argentinean social and
political life, but it was able to make relatively little
progress against the country's economic problems.
The Peronist party won the 1989 elections.
putting Carlos Menem, a former provincial gover-
nor into the presidency. Menem instituted measures
and began the privatisation of state enterprises. He
quickly set free both convicted and untried military
persons and opened heavily protected Argentinean
economy to trade and investment. Since 1989 when
inflation reached nearly 5,000 percent, the once stag-
nant Argentinean economy has turned around and
showed remarkable growth, but also a very low rate
of inflation. In October1999 a coalition formed by
opposition parties won the presidential elections, and
Dr. Fernando de la Rua became the president. Under
the Minister of Economy, Jose Luis Machinea, his
government continued the economic policy oriented
towards reducing country risk and strengthening
macroeconomics fundamentals. Faced with the per-
sistence of the recession that started in October 1998,
in March 2001, the President appointed Domingo
Cavallo as the new Minister of Economy, and a more
proactive programme was launched to spur economic
growth.
However, during the late 1880s and early
1890s, Argentina developed as a country whose
economy was based on the exchange of agricultural
commodities for foreign capital and manufactures.
This economy was dependent on the countries buy-
ing Argentina's low-value products and in return
selling value-added manufactures to the
Argentineans. The political power based on the sup-
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port of labour in the mid-20th century resulted in the
provision of expensive employment benefits. This
policy raised production costs, without a correspond-
ing plan to increase productivity. The government
"closed" the economy with protectionist rules, keep-
ing the competitors out during that period. Many
Argentinean goods became un competitive in world
markets. During the past decade, Argentina's admin-
istration implemented fundamental reforms designed
to return Argentina to an "open" economy. Restric-
tive trade and investment barriers fell and non-pro-
ductive state companies were privatised. Financial
accounts were placed on a current basis by linking
the Argentinean peso to the US dollar under the Con-
vertibility Law. In other words, old Argentinean sys-
tem of 15 years ago was replaced by a largely open
regime.
3. Size of the Economy
According to the information's given by the
Argentinean Institute for Statistics, in 2000 the
Argentinean GDP reached USD 285 billion, with
USD 60.4 billion corresponding to manufacturing;
USD 19.9 billion to the primary sector; USD 23.8
billion to health and education; and the remaining to
other goods and services. GDP per capita was USD
7.650, and it was the highest GDP in Latin America.
>From 1990 through 1997 Argentina's
economy grew by almost 51 percent. This shows a
major change from the previous decade: during the
period 1980 - 1990 GDP figures calculated using real
(constant in 1986) pesos showing a largely stagnant
economy, with negative growth (from 10.3 billion
constant pesos in 1980 to 9.2 billion pesos in 1990).
In five of those ten years, Argentina's GDP fell, the
largest drops being about 7 percent both in 1985 and
1989. Alternately, rates of growth in constant terms
were very high in 1991 (10.5 percent), 1992 (10.3
percent), 1993 (5.7 percent), and 1994 (8.0 percent),
and in 1997 (8.1 percent). In US dollar terms, Ar-
gentina's economy has grown, by a combined an-
nual growth rate of 15 percent since 1980, from
roughly USD 20.1 billion to USD 285 billion in 2000.
After the dramatic growth registered during
the period 1990-1994, the "Tequila crisis" in 1995
led to a decline in real GDP of 2.8 percent in 1995.
However, by the second half of 1996 the economy
had recovered and begun to resume a fairly high level
of growth. Numbers for 1996 place Argentina's GDP
at USD 272 billion, up 5.5 percent in real terms from
the prior year. The strongest component of demand
was gross fixed investment, which was 8.9 percent
higher in 1996 than in 1995. Growth in industrial
production was 6.5 percent for the year 1996.
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In 1997, GDP run at a very positive 8.1 pcr-
cent in real terms, to USD 277 billion. Growth in the
economy was led by investment and exports, with
consumption expenditures falling behind. During the
first three quarters of 1998 GDP ran at very high
rates, and for the whole year the economy grew 3.9
percent, to USD 288 billion. Later, in the last quar-
ter of 1998 the Brazilian crisis had a negative im-
pact on Argentina's exports. During 1999 the im-
pact was more severe, resulting in a 2.9 percent de-
cline in GDP. In 2000 the recession continued, with
a GDP decline of 0.5 percent
Another measure of the size of Argentina's
economy is found in per capita GDP, which in 2000
was calculated as USD 7,650. Per capita GDP has
grown 12.5 percent since 1980, when the figure was
USD 712. Argentina's per capita GDP is a little lower
than that of South Korea, but ahead of Malaysia,
Brazil, Chile and Greece.
4. Inflation
In recent years Argentina has experienced
practically no inflation, as a result of the convert-
ibility monetary regime that pegs the Peso to the US
dollar. In 1999 and 2000 Argentina experienced even
a little deflation (-1.2 and -0.9% respectively in con-
sumer prices), basically due to the weakness in do-
mestic demand. Deflation has been most pronounced
in tradable goods, while some service prices have
experienced a little increase. Few countries have had
a worse experience with inflation than Argentina,
and because of this, few countries are more sensi-
tive to the issue. Between 1980 and 1988 consumer
price rises were in the triple digit range every year
except 1986, when they fell to 86 percent.
Argentinean inflation reached a high of 4,924 per-
cent in 1989, dropped to 1,344 percent in 1990, and
then fell to 8 percent in 1991,7.58 in 1992,7.48 in
1993, and finally to 3.9 percent in 1994. Despite all
the financial turmoil in early 1995, Argentina showed
very little inflation for the year (1.6 percent). In 1996,
Argentina had one of the lowest rates of inflation in
the world Gust 0.1 percent); in 1997 inflation was
only 0.3 percent and in 1998 it reached 0.7 percent.
During 1999 it registered a deflation (- l. 8 percent
in consumer prices), as a result of the domestic re-
ceSSIOn.
5. Labour
Labour has been one of the most important
elements in Argentina's economy in recent decades,
and it is obvious that the element has paid the high-
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est cost in the restructuring of the economy. In 2000
Argentina had a potential workforce of about 27.5
million. Near 15 million of them were considered to
be economically active. More than 60 percent of the
active workforce consists of men, although women's
participation in the workforce is increasing.
In 1991, before the privatisation, 8.1 million
(61 percent) were employed in the private sector and
5.1 million (39 percent) in the public sector. Within
the public sector one-third of workers were employed
at the national level and about half at the provincial
level. Within the private sector, 29 percent of people
were employed in operations with five or fewer em-
ployees, while 56 percent worked in operations em-
ploying more than five people.
In 1997 only 6.9 percent were employed in
the public sector and 93.1 percent worked in the pri-
vate sector. About 7.3 percent worked in agriculture,
23.4 percent in manufacturing and construction, and
69. I percent in services.
Argentinean workers have traditionally been
able to achieve a higher standard of living and have
been accorded somewhat higher status than those in
many other countries. But while the average
Argentinean worker may be above the average
worker in some other countries, there is a shortage
of skilled labour in many specialised functional ar-
eas, especially outside Buenos Aires and a few other
larger centres. However, pockets of extremely so-
phisticated production operated by well-trained per-
sonnel have also been developed in specific areas.
Nevertheless, Argentina keeps comprehensive
statistics on employment, unemployment, and under-
employment only for urban areas. During the early
years of the Convertibility Plan, urban employment
increased (up 4.3 percent in 1991, 2.5 percent in
1992, and 1.6 percent in 1993). In those years offi-
cial unemployment ranged between 6.9 percent and
9.9 percent. In 1995 unemployment grew dramati-
cally to 18.4 percent (in May 1995), due largely to
the financial crisis and resulting recession. In 1996,
1997 and 1998 the situation improved, and by Octo-
ber 1998 unemployment declined to 12.4 percent.
Later the situation worsened with the recession, and
in October 2000 unemployment raised to 14.3 %.
In October 1999 urban population officially
totalled 33.2 million people, while urban unemploy-
ment officially accounted for 1.8 million people.
Between October 1990 and October 1999 urban
population grew 19.6 percent and urban employment,
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the number of jobs, had grown by 19.5 percent; how-
ever, the economically active population grew by 29
percent resulting in the increase in unemployment
mentioned above. The high rate of unemployment
has caused a level of social unrest in Argentina. The
situation aggravated in 1998, 1999 and 2000 as a
result of the recession. One of the major political
challenges for the new administration was to improve
the employment situation. That was identified as the
main concern of the population at the last elections.
6. Foreign Participation
in the Economy
Argentina has a long history offoreign invest-
ment. Its present approach, one that is expected to
continue indefinitely, given the growing climate of
internationalism, is designed to attract foreign invest-
ment through the openness of its economy and the
removal of disincentives to outside capital. Argenti-
na's official policy is geared toward encouraging both
insiders and outsiders to bring investment funds into
the country to support growth and development. This
extends to the privatisation of Argentina's huge and
crucial state-run industries and the opening of its fi-
nancial markets, which was closed to many
Argentineans and foreigners as well. After years of
regulatory and procedural roadblocks that protected
national and nationalised industries from outside
participation and competition, foreigners are now
eligible to invest in any economic sector in Argen-
tina. They can do so without obtaining prior approval,
without fear of discriminatory treatment, and with-
out worry over the sanctity and availability of their
earnings or assets.
Some usually relatively minor restrictions per-
sist in specific areas. Even in areas where limits con-
tinue to exist, regulators may pragmatically allow
foreign take-over of existing firms that need help,
even when they will not authorise the creation of
new competing firms by foreign interests.
One-third of all foreign investment-especially
in privatised state industries has come from debt-
equity conversions, in which outside interests buy
sovereign debt at a market discount and cancel it for
a greater amount of equity value in a state industry.
Such swaps are not officially available for private
debt-equity conversions; however, depending on the
specific circumstances, the authorities may author-
ise particular transactions.
The 1993 decree on foreign investment re-
sulted in transparency and the repeal of procedural
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requirements that had served to limit foreign partici-
pation under pre-existing law. Registration of invest-
ment is not compulsory, although Argentina asks in-
vestors to register for statistical purposes (some in-
tra-company transfers of technology do require reg-
istration for tax purposes).
Because they are granted national treatment,
foreigners are eligible for any incentives; however,
the scarcity of funds is causing the government to
phase out most incentives. Nevertheless, some in-
centives designed to direct new investment into un-
developed industrial and geographical areas-particu-
larly mining, petroleum exploration, utility conces-
sions, and tourism development still exist.
Argentina has historically been closely in-
volved with British investors, and that country pro-
vided the majority of investment capital during the
second half of the last century. In the early 1990s,
the USA has become the dominant outside investor
in the country, followed by investors from Europe,
with which Argentina has maintained a long-term
relationship, and increasing investment from neigh-
bouring Chile and Brazil. In terms of total invest-
ment registered for the period 1994-2000, the US
ranks first accounting for 36 percent of all foreign
investment followed by Spain (11.9%), France
(11.0%), Chile (9.8%), Italy (7.1 %) and UK (6.2%).
7. Bankruptcy
However. despite its achievements and eco-
nomic prosperity Argentina bankrupts. The ornate
buildings and wide boulevards of Buenos Aires are
testament of Argentina's booming economy, which
has now joined the history with all other important
events that happened in that country. Poor economic
decisions led to the Argentina's decline from the 10th
richest country in 1913 to the 36th in 1998. Argenti-
na's USD 132 billion debt represents about one sev-
enth of all debt held by all developing countries. The
IMF has extended loans nine times since 1983. The
latest crisis came from overspending on national level
during an economic slowdown. Much of the money
has been spent on the welfare state and wages, but
the state corruption has also been partly responsible
for the crisis. Economic crisis took its place in all
sectors. The national debt is USD 132 billion, unem-
ployment increased to 18 %, spending has cut for
USD 8 billion, state pensions and wages have cut
for 13 %, private sector wages fall by 20 %, and the
budget deficit is approximately USD 7.8 billion.
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8. Latest Events
The whole economic situation leads to the
conclusion that Brazil and Uruguay could also be
struck by the crisis and that they will not be the only
ones. Last year's events led to political crisis in Bra-
zil while the presidential crisis almost caused an eco-
nomic one. More than 50 per cent of Argentinean
citizens live below the level of poverty. It seems as
if nobody cares, except the journalists and political
scientists. The countries of Latin America carne out
of misery. The USA made Brads stocks, which be-
came a synonym for economic recovery. There is no
country that is now going through serious financial
crisis, and lacks the resources at the same time. Nev-
ertheless, we have a thousand of such examples 111
Latin America. However, it was impossible to con-
trol the debts and spending. The new economic cri-
sis is possible. The value of Argentinean peso rap-
idly falls, and the new crisis could strike that coun-
try again. American investors, familiar with the cri-
sis that occurred in the history of the USA, have be-
come increasingly suspicious, stopping theirs invest-
ments in Argentinean economy. Brazil has economic
problems because of its changes in global financial
market, and its impossibility to sell stocks. Brazil
also has problems with its financial liquidity. For-
eign investors might withdraw theirs capital out of
the country, which could lead to the big crisis as well.
This year's market is extremely unfriendly to the
developing markets and foreign investors being in-
creasingly suspicious so they keep theirs capital in
their own country. That can lead to the total with-
drawn of capital and the investments that are impor-
tant for keeping the Brazilian balance of payments
on the same level. Foreign investments in Latin
American states fall in percentages, from USD 105
billion in 1999 to USD 80 billion in 2001. After
Argentinean bankruptcy, the most dramatic events
happened in Uruguay. Only a year ago, Uruguay
had the biggest investment rating in the entire Latin
America. Uruguayan banks were safe place to hide
capital for the Argentinean middle elass who was
taking their capital out of country. More than 60 per-
cen t of depos i ts in Uruguayan ban ks were
Argentinean, or in other words, Uruguayan banks
were surviving mostly from their Argentinean cli-
ents. After Argentinean bankruptcy, Argentineans
who had capital in Uruguayan banks took it out, and
that almost led to the bank crisis in Uruguay, be-
cause the 50 percent of money in the bank sector left
the country. At the beginning of August, the Bank of
Uruguay froze all deposits in Uruguayan banks in
order to prevent the big crisis that was most likely to
happen. However, Brazil is still the biggest concern
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in region, because that country gives 40 per cent of
total production in whole Latin America. The line
when certain country gets the name of potentially
risking country has already been crossed in both
Brazil and Uruguay. That line has been crossed just
before the Argentineans broke down in December.
In only two days the value of peso, fell for 15 per-
cent. Political instability in Brazil has increased eco-
nomic problems in the entire region, which has been
followed by the suspiciousness of the international
community. Instructed by the Argentinean experi-
ence, international community is very careful when
it comes to the credit expiration dates. The whole
financial market has been upset by the recent events
in Latin America, and that affects Brazil in paying
its debts and Argentina in its recovery. The hardest
card that Brazil has is the fiscal policy that helped
Brazil to escape Argentinean destiny and its remark-
able relations with the IMF, which approved Brazil
USD 10billion of allowance. Another Brazilian plus
is the flexibility of its international course that helped
him to avoid the economic crisis. Depreciation of
peso allowed Brazil to keep exports on a sufficient
level and it increased the market surplus, which keeps
the crisis pressure off.
9. Conclusion
Regarding Argentina, which is the main topic
of this article, recent figures reveal that tax receipts
had fallen by 17 % in the first half of November
(l.y.) compared with the same period of the year 2002.
Argentina's competitors bave also taken advantage
of the country's monetary inflexibility, capturing
export markets previously held by Argentinean com-
panies. Lenders are demanding a bigger risk premium
[or lending money to developing countries, and pri-
vate lending is running at far lower levels than it
was in the early 1990s. Many analysts believe that
USA's intervention is the only key for tbe final solu-
tion of Argentinean economic problems. However,
one of the important issues that must be considered
is terrorism. The real question is: is there a possibil-
ity that the economic crisis in Latin America could
lead to the world terrorism similar to the one that is
coming from the East, powered by the Islam terror-
ist organisations such as Al-Qaeda for example? If
the USA intervene in Latin Americas economy, the
question is, would that give any solution of prob-
lems, or would it cause an even bigger crisis in Latin
America? However, there is a possibility that, if the
USA intervene Latin Americans could see it as in-
terference in their national politics and internal is-
sues. In that case that could lead to crisis that Latin
America has never been through. Moreover, the aim
of this article was not to discuss those possibilities;
however, the intention was to present the economic
situation which could lead to that, by giving detailed
explanation of past and present Argentinean eco-
nomic situation and brief review of the economic
situation in some other countries. •
